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1. Introduction 
The regulation of IPOs has a long history around the world and is linked to intrinsic 
informational asymmetries that surround new listings [Chan et al. (2004), Chambers and Dimson 
(2009), Carpentier et al. (2012), Ekkayokkaya and Pegniti (2012), Burhop et al. (2014)]. 
Regulatory objectives regarding IPOs have sought the twin goals of financial regulation: efficient 
pricing and investor protection [IOSCO 2010]. These goals have been pursued with a variety of 
instruments. Disclosure requirements, audit regulation, contractual obligations of issuers and 
underwriters, arrangements (including constraints) for IPO pricing, price guarantees, 
overallotment options and trading restrictions for the after-market represent the wide range of 
regulatory interventions across developed and emerging markets.  
As we would expect, the sophistication and timing of regulatory tools appear to vary with 
the degree of market development, the sophistication of market agents and market conditions. 
Regulatory techniques first introduced in developed markets, (viz. disclosure requirements, audit 
regulation or book-building), have been emulated in emerging markets in the process of their 
development. Regulatory interventions have been subjected to empirical tests which seek to 
clarify their effectiveness. These tests are based on diverse theoretical views about the 
desirability of regulation and the power of markets to self-regulate, to which we return below. 
In this paper we focus on price limits. These have been a controversial subject and their 
empirical evaluation has been tested on the question of whether they affect price volatility. Here 
we pose a different and simple question: do price limits in the after-market have any effect on the 
well-established market inefficiency that is IPO underpricing? This simple question has not been 
asked before. But it is a reasonable question. In both theory and practice, early aftermarket 
conditions are important to those who make IPO pricing decisions. The answer to this question 
may inform regulatory decisions beyond what existing empirical evidence has already provided.  
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The occasion for asking this simple question is an enticing empirical opportunity 
presented by changes in Greek regulatory arrangements in the 1990s, a time when the Greek 
market experienced considerable development. General daily limits on price variation were 
imposed for the first time in 1992 and lasted until the end of the decade. Although directed to 
market stability in general, price limits had collateral consequences for the early IPO 
aftermarket. Recognizing this, regulators later decided that policy towards IPOs should change 
and price limits were relaxed specifically for early trading of IPO stocks in late 1996. This policy 
change allows us to test an area that has not been much examined in other empirical literature on 
IPO regulation: the impact of price limits on underpricing in conditions closely resembling a 
controlled experiment.  
As we explain in the body of the paper, the impact of price limits on early trading of IPO 
stocks and the implications of the removal of these limits show, based on the Greek experiment, 
the occurrence of two synchronous effects: on one hand, the imposition of limits appears to 
reduce overall underpricing but, on the other hand, it also delays and complicates early price 
adjustment. We argue that these effects correspond to received theoretical reasoning and 
correlated empirical findings from various markets and times. In a broad sense, the explanation 
of variation in IPO underpricing across markets and times cannot be oblivious to regulatory 
interventions, as several authors have argued [Loughran, Ritter and Ryndqvist (2004)]. 
Furthermore, regulatory intervention itself must be evaluated in search for policy implications, as 
regulators continue to seek effective tools whenever they perceive market malfunction or failure. 
Looking more specifically at after-market arrangements for newly listed stocks, we note 
that non-discretionary trading limitations such as price limits, trading halts or circuit-breakers 
continue to be used in many markets, especially emerging ones. For example, as recently as 
January 2012, SEBI, the Indian market regulator, imposed restrictive daily price limits for first-
day trading of IPO shares, attempting to ‘prevent IPO manipulation’, in one of the largest 
emerging markets. Is this persistence of price limits warranted?  
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Price limits on stock market variation are a controversial subject both among practitioners 
and scholars. The central issue is the speed and efficiency of price discovery. Different lines of 
argument have been formulated about the impact of price limits on the quality of price 
adjustment. One side argues that limits are inefficient because they suppress rapid price 
discovery after an information shock [Fama (1989)]. A contrary line suggests that limits offer 
opportunities for “cooling down”  of  investor sentiment in an environment of information 
asymmetry, and thus allow for smoother price adjustment [Hanley (1993), Choudhry and Nanda 
(1998), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Thomadakis et al. (2012)]. Both these views, which we can 
summarize as the competing ‘information’ and ‘overreaction’ hypotheses, are concerned with 
price shocks due to varying intensities and degrees of asymmetry of information. A considerable 
amount of empirical work has attempted to distinguish between these competing hypotheses. The 
impact of limits on volatility, serial correlation and price reversals has been studied with mixed 
results. The two competing views – the ‘information’ and the ‘overreaction’ hypotheses - lead to 
opposing regulatory implications about the desirability of limits.   
An interesting variant of thinking relates to price change that is rooted not in pure 
information shocks but in a different source of disturbance: market manipulation. According to 
this view, the basic regulatory rationale for imposing price limits is to constrain the  potential 
for manipulation by market participants who have the means to conduct manipulative 
schemes, [Kim and Park (2010)]. This rationale seems to us to be very pertinent to newly issued 
shares where asymmetries of information are more intense and the potential for manipulation is 
larger, especially in emerging markets where weaker competition and lack of contractual and 
investor sophistication weaken market-based deterrence to manipulation.  
 In the extensive literature on underpricing of IPOs, the effect of regulatory interventions 
has been examined, although not price limits, specifically. An example of this approach is the 
‘regulatory overreach hypothesis’ relating to the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on US IPO 
activity [Gao, Ritter and Zhu (2013)]. Arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley improves transparency of 
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primary offerings, Johnston and Madura (2009) present evidence that IPO underpricing in the US 
has declined after implementation of the act. 
 The Greek market in the 1990s, on which we focus, was classified as an ‘emerging 
market’, despite its participation in the European Union and its alignment to European legal 
arrangements. We have therefore paid special attention to tests of regulatory effects in emerging 
markets. Based on evidence from the Pacific Region, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) have 
advanced the conjecture that regulatory intervention appears to increase underpricing and distort 
market function. In line with this, evidence from the important process of market liberalization in 
China has also furnished clear signs that early overregulation caused very high underpricing 
which abated as regulations were phased out (Cheung et al. (2009)).  
 These approaches can be used as prima-facie arguments against any regulatory 
intervention, but in our opinion more careful reading of the evidence implies that it is not 
regulation in general but specific devices of intervention that may or may not be effective in 
bringing about desirable goals. Empirical investigations of regulation, in any case, do not focus 
primarily on price limits but involve more complex interventions. Price limits as a specific 
instrument can be separately evaluated only when they constitute autonomous regulatory policy, 
allowing us to empirically isolate their effects on underpricing. The example of the Athens Stock 
Exchange offers this opportunity.  
 The debate on the value of regulation is very wide and extends from institutional  theories  
(e.g LaPorta et. al. (1998), Shleifer (2005)) to empirical examinations in a variety of contexts 
(Healy and Palepu, (2001); Mulherin, (2007);  Zingales, (2009)).  Our work does not purport to 
offer a general evaluation of regulation in the sense of these broad works. Instead it offers a valid 
empirical approach to a specific regulatory issue:  the effect of price limits on the underpricing of 
IPOs.  
We study price limits as they were applied in a particular exchange and at a particular 
time. We are cognizant of the fact that the effect of any particular regulatory device, such as 
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price limits, may be conditioned by the more general institutional and technical arrangements, as 
the broad theoretical studies we mentioned above suggest. Thus, they may not be necessarily 
appropriate for all markets and all institutional contexts.   
In the Greek market itself, price limits on early trading of IPO shares was eventually 
removed and book-building was introduced as an alternative device.  We show in the paper that 
this alternative also had an effect on lowering under-pricing, although a weaker one than the 
earlier price limits. Book-building however required a certain amount of development, 
sophistication and competition among institutional investors in order to work and these were not 
necessarily available in earlier times.  
The use of regulatory tools may have a time-specific and development-specific nature. After 
all, it is well understood that regulations and market innovations co-evolve and influence each 
other. Our evidence in this paper is that price limits effectively reduced under-pricing in the 
Athens Stock Exchange in the 1990s. Therefore they can prove to be a useful instrument in the 
regulatory toolbox under similar circumstances elsewhere in emerging or newly-established 
markets. 
In the balance of the paper we provide a review of relevant literature in section 2.  In section 
3 we discuss regulations and underwriting arrangements in the Athens Stock Exchange. In 
section 4 we present hypotheses, methodology and test variables. Section 5 includes empirical 
results and section 6 presents robustness checks. Section 7 offers discussion of results and 
section 8 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related Literature 
The empirical literature on IPOs is extensive and international. Its most voluminous branch 
concerns short - term performance of newly listed shares. The tenor of findings is exemplified 
by comparative studies such as Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1995) and Gajewski and Gresse 
(2006). These studies establish that initial IPO underpricing and the appearance of positive excess 
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returns in the short run is a generalized phenomenon around the world. However, the intensity 
of underpricing exhibits great variation across markets and times. Many factors, including 
regulation, have been examined to account for this variation. These relate to demand and 
investor sentiment, competitive supply, firm characteristics that proxy for uncertainty, and 
incentives of underwriters and owners. We draw on these extensive findings in section 4 
below, in choosing control variables for our tests of underpricing in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. 
The contribution of regulatory policies to the variation of underpricing does not figure 
prominently in the majority of studies. It is taken up however in both theoretical and 
empirical contexts of inquiry about the general impact of regulation on capital markets. 
Since it is broadly felt that asymmetry of information lies at the root of underpricing, as 
Rock (1986) originally argued, regulatory policies of mandatory disclosure are widely 
acknowledged. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Sherman and Titman (2002), Ekkayokkaya and Pegniti 
(2012) exemplify arguments on how better information quality can lead to reduced underpricing. 
In line with these arguments the quality of disclosure standards must remain a major concern of 
regulators. 
Regulation however is not limited to disclosure requirements. Rules that embrace the pricing 
and allocation of new offers, aftermarket arrangements and constraints on issuers and 
underwriters comprise the regulatory toolbox in many cases. Regulations, as Leuz and Wysocki 
(2008) successfully argue, must function as a low-cost commitment device for preventing market 
failures. Arguments suggesting, as well as casting doubt, on the net benefit of capital market 
regulation abound, with largely mixed conclusions [Healy and Palepu (2001), Mulherin (2007), 
Shleifer (2005), Zingales (2009)]. From a policy standpoint, the position is also moot. In part this 
is due to factors that limit empirical measurement and testing of one or the other viewpoint. For 
example, the emergence of institutional arrangements surrounding new-issue markets evolve 
frequently as a matter of contractual agreements among market participants and cannot be 
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directly ascribed to mandatory regulations. Furthermore, the impact of regulatory interventions 
can be tested only when discrete changes in regulations occur. In practice, many regulations 
change in piecemeal fashion, following an evolutionary path that intermingles with market 
development. Thus, it is important to discover empirical conditions of discrete and well defined 
regulatory change that enable focused testing, as is the case we examine here.  
 The quest for appropriate regulation has been renewed in emerging markets, with 
empirical work over the last two decades. In the process of catch-up, many of these markets 
imported regulatory standards from advanced economies but also formulated regulations 
according to local brands of investor protection, perceptions of fairness or social welfare. These 
offered accordingly a new field of testing for the effectiveness of regulatory practices. This 
literature and the issue of appropriate regulation are of special relevance to the Greek case, since 
the ASE was classified as an emerging market in the 1990s and many new regulatory 
arrangements were inaugurated over that period.  
In this strand of literature, Pettway and Kaneko (1996) in a Japanese study examined IPO 
underpricing before and after a change in regulation in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They find 
that a relaxation of constraints which delayed the commencement of trading of newly listed 
shares led to less severe underpricing. Several studies have looked at the liberalization of the 
market in mainland China over the last decade. Tian (2011) observes that underpricing in 
Chinese IPOs is mainly caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the 
control of IPO supplies. Cheung et al. (2009) also document the impact of liberalization in 
China. They note that Chinese IPOs exhibit huge underpricing, which decreases over the period 
of liberalization and that, after adopting a series of regulatory reforms allowing underwriters 
discretion in the determination of issue price, this ‘regulatory underpricing’ component vanishes.  
In a number of studies that address various aspects of national regulatory requirements 
across different Asian countries there are additional insights on the implications of institutional 
constraints for underpricing, such as Chen (1992 ) for Taiwan, Kao et al. (2009) and Tian (2011) 
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for China, Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012) for Thailand  and Chang et al. (2012) for Korea. In 
the case of Korea, Chang et al. (2012) for example conclude that the high level of underpricing 
in Korean IPOs is the unintended consequence of regulations designed to promote fairness. Two 
aspects of the regulations distort the process - an “essential price” formula that severely 
understates the value of the firm and bid exclusion rules that give investors a strong incentive to 
cluster their bids so as to avoid being excluded from the offering.  
An early study of the Athens Stock Exchange by Kazantzis and Levis (1995) looked at a 
different regulatory intervention that was in force from 1987 to December 1990. This was an 
obligation imposed on the underwriter to offer price support to IPO shares for six months after 
listing. They concluded that “…measures to intervene in the pricing process …result in excessive 
underpricing”. 
The conclusions of much of the empirical literature on direct regulatory interventions in 
emerging markets have been aptly summarized by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), who 
advance an enticing conjecture: regulatory intervention appears to distort market function and 
increase underpricing of IPOs. This conjecture is of course based on tests of regulatory policies 
that include a variety of measures in various countries. None of these however, have presented a 
direct test of price limits in the early after-market. Our Greek experiment will therefore extend 
the field over which the validity of this conjecture is tested.  
Price limits and their effects on IPO underpricing have not been directly tested to our 
knowledge. However, the more general debate on the effectiveness of price limits for market 
operation has been an important and controversial one in finance. Theoretical and empirical 
arguments have focused on the effect of price limits on volatility of returns and on their time 
behavior. Different lines of argument have been formulated on the general impact of price 
limits (or more generally ‘circuit breakers’). One line proposes that limits are inefficient as 
they suppress rapid price discovery without reducing overall volatility, since any information 
shock is eventually reflected in the price [Fama (1989)]. A contrary line suggests that there is 
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investor overreaction and that limits offer opportunities for ‘cooling down’  of  investor 
sentiment, allowing for both smoother price adjustment and lower volatility [ Choudhry and 
Nanda (1998)]. An interesting variant of thinking is that the basic rationale for imposing 
price limits is the diminution of the  potential for market manipulation by market participants 
who have the means to conduct manipulative schemes, [Kim and Park (2010)]. In principle the 
banishment of manipulation should also reduce volatility.  
Many empirical studies of the effect of price limits have been conducted, again with 
emphasis in Asian emerging markets and again with mixed results, as surveyed for example in 
Kim and Yang (2004). The emphasis of these studies is the question of whether limits affect 
volatility, volatility spillovers and trading efficiencies. Kim and Yang (2009) have examined the 
effect of price limits on IPO trading in Taiwan. They have concluded that limits increase follow-
up volatility and that they obstruct early price discovery. Their tests could not be applied to the 
underpricing question however, since they had no comparable data from observations with 
limits and observations without limits.  
This type of inquiry has also been undertaken with respect to the Athens Stock Exchange. 
Phylaktis et al. (1999) examined the competing ‘information’ and ‘overreaction’ hypotheses by 
assessing the effects of price limits on volatility in the Athens Stock Exchange. They found 
strong support for the information hypothesis, which implies that price limits only slow down 
the process of adjustment and have no effect on stock volatility. More recently, Diacogiannis et 
al. (2005) test the Athens Stock Exchange for evidence of investor overreaction to price limits 
themselves. They show that price limits delay market adjustment to a news disturbance, through 
the operation of delayed orders, and that prices react positively to ‘limit hits’ followed by 
market reversals. They argue that price limits do not resolve market irregularities, and suggest 
that their elimination beyond 1999 was a rational decision [Gao (2013)]. This evidence implies 
that tests of the effect of price limits on the early IPO after-market must take into account, inter 
alia, the possible reaction to the ‘event’ of a given price reaching a limit on a given day of 
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trading.  
3. Regulatory Limits and Underwriting Arrangements in the Athens Stock Exchange  
3.1 Changing Restrictions on Daily Price Variation  
Until June 1992, price fluctuations in the Athens Stock Exchange were unconstrained for 
all shares. In July 1992 the Exchange imposed a limit of ± 8% on daily variation. The regulation 
did not single out IPO shares for special treatment but applied uniformly. Its motivation was to 
protect investors and the market from ‘speculative attacks’. The context of this regulatory action 
was one of macroeconomic risks, exchange rate pressure and fears that the Greek market might 
experience a precipitous decline. As the circumstances changed in subsequent periods, the 
market started to rise, a healthy supply of IPOs appeared but the limits remained in force.  
Regulatory intent, as we said, did not specifically single out newly listed stocks nor was 
there any explicit statement about the need for limits for them specifically. In that sense, the 
regulation of the IPO after-market was simply a collateral consequence of a more general policy. 
In any day a stock price could fluctuate within a range of ±8 percent. When it reached the limit, 
no more trading could take place on the same day, except at (or of course within) the limit range. 
The stock would start trading again on the next day, its starting price being the limit price of the 
previous day.  
Almost four years later, on December 1
st
, 1996, regulatory policy focused on newly 
trading stocks, reflecting a concern of regulators about delays in price discovery. Prices of newly 
listed shares were allowed to fluctuate within a limit of ±99% for the first three days of trading 
(from the fourth day on, the limit of ±8% continued to apply). The limit of ±99 percent did not 
have specific policy significance; it was simply the highest possible daily variation that the 
electronic system of the Exchange could accommodate at that time. 
The regulation changed again on December 1
st
, 1999 when it became technically feasible 
to abolish the ±99 percent limit; thereafter, the price of a newly listed company was allowed to 
fluctuate freely during the first three days of trading.  
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The rationale for these liberalizations was to improve the speed of price discovery. The 
Stock Exchange and the Regulator (the Capital Market Commission) agreed that newly listed 
stocks, which were coming from both the main and the second-tier markets, needed unrestricted 
early trading, in order to achieve rapidly their short – term ‘equilibrium’ price. Thus, whereas the 
imposition of limits back in 1992 was general, their relaxation was specifically directed to IPOs. 
This creates conditions of a ‘controlled experiment’ for testing the impact of price limits on IPO 
pricing.  
In Figure 1 we show a timeline of the changes in Greek regulations. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 1 About Here 
          ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
During the period under examination (1990-2013) 351 IPOs were launched on the Greek 
market. The discrete changes in price limits allow a division of the sample into sub-periods:  
(a) January 1, 1990 to 30th June 1992 (no limits)  
(b) July 1, 1992 to 30th November 1996 (±8% price limits) 
(c) December 1, 1996 to 30th November 1999 (±99% during the first three days of 
trading) 
(d) December 1, 1999 to 31st December 2013 (no limits for the first three days of trading) 
 
Throughout the period, listing requirements for the main market were more severe than 
for the parallel market. The main difference was one of size and required track record, as in most 
cases of such market distinctions; parallel market admission in Greece was explicitly directed 
towards the facilitation of younger and less well established firms, hence also riskier ones, to 
enable them to raise capital directly on the Exchange.  
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3.2 The Greek Underwriting Environment 
Underwriting of primary share offers has been practiced in Greece since the 1970s. In the 1990s 
banks and investment service firms, including exchange members, were licensed to provide 
underwriting services. The legal requirements for underwriting had been aligned to the relevant 
European directives since the mid-1980s and were renewed as European legislation itself 
evolved in the 1990s. Thus, for example, any firm offering underwriting services had to comply 
with capital adequacy requirements as specified in the European Investment Services Directive 
(93/22/EEC). The most important legal development with regard to underwriting in the 1990s 
was the passage of Law 2651 of 1998 which strengthened transparency requirements for IPOs, 
clarified the limits of underwriter liability and enabled the use of book-building as a method of 
pricing.  
In fact, the majority of IPOs undertaken until the end of January 2000 were launched 
using a fixed price auction. Beginning on January 31 of 2000, book-building was mandated for 
all issues above the size of 25 billion drachmas. This mandated change was instituted after the 
price limits had been phased out for the first three trading days, and can be viewed as the 
adoption of a more sophisticated (and market friendly) instrument for regulating the offer price 
and the after-market for IPOs. Overallotment options (green shoes) were used only sporadically 
(in only 7 cases), mainly again for large issues. In our overall sample of 351 IPOs, book-building 
was used in 90 cases, which included especially placements directed to international institutional 
investors.  
The underwriting market remained pretty concentrated in Greece during the period 
studied here. Five major banks handled about 65 percent of all IPOs in the period 1990-2013, 
each of them enjoying a market share between 10 and 15 percent. The remaining IPOs were 
underwritten by a larger number of minor banks and investment firms. The distribution of 
underwriting business is shown in Appendix Table C. The high concentration of underwriting 
activity makes possible a clear distinction between ‘reputable underwriters’ (the five major 
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banks) and ‘inexperienced underwriters’. We pick up this distinction with a dummy variable 
which is described in the next section.  
 
4. Hypothesis, Data and Methodology 
4.1 The Effect of Regulatory Price Limits: Simple Exposition and Hypotheses 
Consider the price limit and successive returns: 
Letting, 
CP(t) be the first unconstrained closing price on day t 
OP be the offer price 
u(t) be the percent underpricing on day t, 
 
it follows that:   
                          u(t) = {CP(t) -  OP}/OP                                               (1). 
 
Denoting the expected value of underpricing when no limits are present by uF(1) and 
when limits are in force by uC(t), we wish to compare, ceteris paribus, underpricing in two 
different regimes:  
                            uF(1) (> or <) uC(t).                                                  (2). 
The direction of the inequality in (2) describes the effect of the regulatory regime as expressed in 
the imposition or removal of daily price limits. 
The null hypothesis is that regulation by price limit is irrelevant to the efficiency of IPO 
pricing   [i.e. equality of the two sides in (2)].  In this case, underpricing is unchanged in the two 
regimes but the establishment of an unconstrained (short-term equilibrium) price is simply 
delayed by the price limit.  
There are theoretical grounds for a hypothesis of expanded inefficiency. Fama and 
French (1996) have argued that price limits, as they delay price discovery, will increase 
 15 
volatility. The impact of such an effect on observed underpricing in a sample of IPOs can be 
positive as underpriced issues become more volatile. In this case, the direction of the inequality 
in (2) will favor a larger uC(t). One specific way in which price limits may distort the market 
process is by inducing inefficient prices through an ‘overreaction’ whenever limits are actually 
reached during a trading day. In their study of price limits on the Athens Stock Exchange, 
Diakogiannis et.al. (2005) find strong evidence of over-reaction to the ‘event’ of a stock hitting 
the daily limit on any trading day. The implication of such overreaction for short-term IPO 
returns would be a manifestation of increased underpricing. In sum, price discovery delays and 
additional volatility or/and overreactions due to the operation of price limits would, under this 
theoretical approach, confirm the more general conjecture by Loughran, Ritter and Rydgvist 
(1994) that regulatory intervention increases underpricing by distorting the market process. This 
hypothesis of expanded inefficiency would imply that the direction of inequality (2) would be in 
favor of a larger uC(t).  
A competing hypothesis can also be formulated, arguing that:  
                                        uF(1) > uC(t).                                                (3). 
This is a hypothesis of reduced inefficiency of IPO pricing and its gist is a very simple 
proposition.  In line with most of the literature, underpricing is used strategically by underwriters 
and/or issuers to reap rents for themselves or favorite clients through early trading returns, [Ruud 
(1993), Cestau (2012) and Hanley and Hoberg (2012)]. Price limits restrict the opportunities for 
such rent-seeking behavior and the strategic use of underpricing. Hence, the imposition of price 
limits will moderate underpricing and bring offer prices closer to efficient levels.  
General arguments on price limits that promote a ‘cooling off’ effect provide additional 
support to this contrary hypothesis. A significant strand of literature on short - term underpricing 
shows that early trading returns on newly listed shares are excessive and affected by early 
investor sentiment, [Baker and Wurgler [(2006), (2007)], Campbell et al. (2009)]. Furthermore, 
some theorists, notably Ljungquist et al. (2006) and Cornelli et al. (2006), have proposed that 
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initial underpricing can be seen as a strategy on the part of issuers and underwriters to 
appropriate ‘hot’ investor sentiment, in the short-run. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that 
higher information asymmetry intensifies the appearance of investor sentiment. Campbell et al. 
(2009) offer empirical verification of this assertion for the case of IPO stocks. 
If early investor sentiment, whether spontaneous or managed by underwriters, is 
responsible for underpricing (or some portion thereof), it is plausible that its manifestation will 
be hampered by limits on price variation. As a result, the attractiveness of underpriced issues to 
short-term investors will be tempered; In line with arguments presented in Boehme and Colak 
(2012) the clientele of IPO shares may then shift away from short-term speculators.  
All in all, as the prospect of rapid price increases is reduced, issuers and underwriters will 
also have reduced incentives to underprice and offering prices will be closer to intrinsic values. 
The argument by Kim and Park (2010) presents an interesting extension to this thinking. They 
argue that the basic rationale for imposing price limits is the diminution of the potential for 
market manipulation by market participants who have the means to conduct manipulative 
schemes. This rationale has strong implications for newly listed shares where asymmetries of 
information are more intense, price history does not exist, supply is by definition managed and 
the potential for manipulation is therefore larger. But in this case, the opportunities for 
manipulation are mostly in the hands of underwriters and issuers who are the parties that decide 
IPO pricing.  
The hypothesis we test with Greek IPO data focuses on the direction of inequality (2), 
and the two competing hypotheses we presented.  
 
4.2 The Data on Greek IPOs 
 This study examines the initial performance of 351 IPOs listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) in the Main, Parallel and New boards during the period from January 1990 to 
December 2013. The sample contains only ordinary common stocks; it excludes the issue of 
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preference stock as well as transfers from the Parallel to the Main market. The study extracts 
data mainly from IPO prospectuses, but also the daily press, ASE reports (History of ASE, Fact 
Books, Annual and Monthly Statistical Bulletins) and Annual Reports of the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission (HCMC). The prospectuses were referenced from the library and website of 
the ASE and the HCMC market resource centre.  
Prospectuses provide data for each of the issues regarding the offer price, total gross 
proceeds, age of companies, proportion of shares sold by owners, list of underwriters, and 
closing date of the offer. Other additional information about the companies comes from 
databases available at Compustat, Datastream and Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation, at the public libraries of ASE and the HCMC, the library of the Bank of Greece and 
the database of the Greek Parliament. In a few cases, we approached companies directly. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
Please Insert Table 1 About Here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 provides a categorisation of the IPOs, into the three market boards of Greece 
(Main, Parallel and New). The highest number of IPOs was launched in 2000 with 53 cases (18 
in the Main market and 35 in the Parallel market), followed by 46 IPOs in 1994 (36 in the Main 
market and 10 in the Parallel market). The lowest number of IPOs was registered in 2008 and 
2009 (1 IPO in the Main market in each year). No IPOs took place in the years of the Greek 
financial crisis 2010-2013. 
 
4.3 Test  Methodology 
 
In periods when there are no price limits the raw measure of underpricing is the percent 
first day return over the offer price. However, in periods when price limits are in force, the first 
day return is a curtailed measure of actual underpricing, whenever the price limit is actually 
reached. We use a simple procedure to compute the short term unconstrained return: returns of 
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the second day are estimated if first-day returns are bounded by the daily limit. If second day 
returns are also bounded, returns of the third day are estimated. The process goes on until the day 
when the price is formed without constraint. In summary, to compute the unconstrained return, 
we calculated – for each offering listed in the ASE during periods without price limits, the first 
day return; in the two sub-periods (July 1992-November 1996, and December 1996-November 
1999) when price limits were in force, the return on the first day was recorded when it was 
unbounded. Finally, if price limits were effective, we computed the first unconstrained return, as 
described above. Calculations of raw and market adjusted underpricing returns are therefore as 
follows:  
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Where t denotes the first day with unconstrained return, OPi,0 is the IPO offer price as per 
prospectus of company ‘i’, EPi,t is the unconstrained price (closing price of IPO of company ‘i’ at the 
end of trading day t), MIt is the price of the General Index in ASE in the end of the first day of 
unconstrained trading, and MI0 is the price of the General Index in ASE on the offer price day. 
Using these calculations we produce the estimate of unconstrained return (MAU).  
It is noteworthy that the great peak in returns appears during the last two quarters of 
1999, a time when the Greek market as a whole achieved all-time highs (6355.04 units in the 
ASEGI on 17
th
 September 1999). Although market declines set in subsequently during the last 
quarter of that year, IPO activity and strong underpricing continued.  
Furthermore, to test for returns free of other systematic influences (i.e. industry-specific 
shocks), we provide an alternative definition where the returns are further adjusted for industry 
specific disturbances:  
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OII j,t is the index of  industry group j, orthogonal to the market index
2
, and i depicts the 
company, j depicts the industry and t depicts the time period.   
 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of raw and market adjusted initial returns. It also 
shows statistics on the number of days required for prices to reach an unconstrained level during 
periods of active price limits.  
Specifically, Panel A of Table 2 shows the mean (median) unadjusted and market 
adjusted returns for each of the regulatory sub-periods. The mean unadjusted return at the end of 
the first trading day, when no ceiling restriction was present, is 43.74 percent. The market 
adjusted return in the same period is 44.10 percent. During the period with the limit of ±8 
percent, the unconstrained unadjusted return is 26.22 percent, whereas the corresponding market 
adjusted return has a mean of 29.62 percent.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please Insert Table 2 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
During the period with a limit of ±99 percent, the mean unconstrained return is 112.88 percent 
and the market adjusted return is 105.66 percent. What is notable is that whereas average returns 
of the period with the ±8 percent limit are lower than those of the unconstrained period, the 
returns of the period with the ±99 percent limit are much higher than all others. This difference is 
attributable to the fact that the period with the ±99 percent limit includes a ‘hot market’ incident 
with the highest returns ever observed in the Greek market. This will of course be taken into 
account in the regression tests that follow.  
During the sub-period where the price limit was at ±8 percent, 2.59 days were required 
on average to reach an unconstrained price (Panel C of Table 2). It is worth noting that of the 93 
IPOs launched in this period 26 reached an unconstrained price on the first trading day, 14 on the 
                                                 
2
  OII is computed as the residual from the regression of each industry index on contemporaneous values of the market index.  
 20 
second, 12 on the third and 20 on the fourth day. In other words, in about 80 percent of the cases 
the unconstrained price was reached within the first four days of trading. In the extreme cases, 
two IPOs recorded their unconstrained price after 10 and 11 trading days respectively. 
           In the period when the price limit was at ±99 percent, the mean number of days required 
to reach an unconstrained level was 0.67. In other words, on average, IPO returns reached their 
unconstrained level within the first trading day. Thus, 38 out of 67 IPOs reached an 
unconstrained price on the first trading day and 17 on the second day. Thus, 82 percent of IPOs 
reached an unconstrained price within two trading days.  In extreme cases however, the shares in 
four IPOs rose by 99 percent for three consecutive days. Thus, even the wide constraint of ±99 
percent proved to be binding in a significant number of cases and this was clearly related to the 
‘hot market’ incident of 1999.  
In Table 3 we show descriptive statistics for initial returns and for some of the main 
control variables broken down by period and by listing board classification.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------          
Please Insert Table 3 About Here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The main observation in Table 3 is that underpricing is consistently higher in the parallel 
and new markets as compared to the main market. Prima facie this is an expected result as the 
quality of information is expected to be lower in companies entering the parallel and new 
markets, which are generally perceived as riskier placements.  
Overall average underpricing is registered at a quite high level: it is 52.63 percent for the 
entire sample, 37.04 percent for the main market and 71.21 percent for the parallel market.  
 
4.5 Regulatory Variables 
          We define two binary dummy variables, one for each of the two periods with price limits 
on daily variation. Thus, CAP99 represents periods when a daily limit of ±99 percent that 
applied to the first three days of trading; CAP8 represents periods with the ±8 percent price limit. 
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The specification of the regulatory dummy variables implies of course that periods with no price 
limits are considered uniformly as ‘unregulated’ periods.    
 We also introduce a variable that takes the value of 1 if book-building has been used and 
0 otherwise. As we mentioned above, book-building became mandatory for IPOs above a size of 
25 billion drachmas on January 31 of 2000, and was finally imposed for all IPOs on July 8 of 
2004. 
 
4.6 Control Variables 
We must consider market conditions, especially as our sample contains visible ‘hot 
market’ incidents. Loughran and Ritter [(2002), (2004)]3 report that underpricing increases 
substantially in a ‘hot market’ and then falls in the cold market. Lowry and Schwert (2002), 
Benveniste et al. (2003) and Derrien and Womack (2003) suggest after measuring the 
relationship of the initial return with market movements, that companies should choose the cold 
issue market to go public so that they can gain from higher prices of hot periods.  
The selection of variables that discriminate ‘hot periods’ is an important issue, as it may 
be the case that different regulatory regimes coincide with different states of the market. Market 
conditions may be detected on the basis of a double criterion on a quarterly basis: on one hand, 
the number of IPOs performed during the quarter and on the other hand, ex-post market returns 
for the quarter. The use of these two variables is an extended version of the methodology used by 
Yung et al. (2008) and Boehme and Colak (2012). We use two continuous variables that capture 
respectively entrepreneur sentiment (on the supply side of IPOs) and investor sentiment (on the 
demand side of IPOs). The first is NUIPO which represents the ratio of the number of IPOs in 
each quarter to the quarterly average of IPOs in the entire sample period. The second is RET and 
represents the ratio of each quarter’s market return to the overall average quarterly return over 
the entire sample period.  
                                                 
3
 Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004) find that underwriters allocate hot IPOs to investors in return for commission business and 
they receive greater profits from commission business when there is greater underpricing. 
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Thus, compared to previously used methodology, this study utilizes two rather than one 
‘hot market’ variables and they are continuous rather than dummy variables. In this manner the 
tests can capture more accurately market sentiment on both sides of the market.  We hypothesize, 
in line with the extant literature, that underpricing is positively related to both NUIPO and RET. 
Test methodology must control for many other factors in order to make effective 
comparisons between regulatory regimes in a cross-sectional model. We therefore apply a series 
of additional control variables, inspired from the literature. These control variables are: listing 
board classification (LBC), age of the firm at the date it goes public (AGE), privatization (PRIV) 
in the case of public sector companies, company size (SIZE), oversubscription (OVER), 
underwriters’ reputation (UR), given ownership (GO) and industry type (IND). We also tested 
for variables of sectoral concentration of IPOs in specific periods.  
Listing Board Classification: Secondary (parallel) markets provide younger and less well-
established firms with the opportunity to raise funds at the IPO market and in follow-on 
offerings. Vismara et al (2012) find that the long-run performance of second-market IPOs in 
Europe is poor relative to that of main market IPOs: 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 
−19.0% for second-market IPOs vs +12.3% for main market IPOs. In this study, we distinguish 
firms listed in the Main board from those listed in the Parallel or New market. However, the New 
Markets’ IPOs were restricted to a few novelty firms, as in most European Countries, [Bornardo 
et al. (2011)]. We therefore group them together with the Parallel market Vismara et. al (2012). 
Age: Age represents the number of years of operating history of a firm prior to going public. 
Following Ritter (1984) we use this variable as a proxy for quality of information. 
Privatization:  Privatization is the transfer of ownership from state owned enterprises to private 
investors through IPOs. Following Perotti and Guney (1993) and Jones et. al (1999) we attach a 
value of 1 to IPOs of privatizing public sector firms.  
SIZE: Zarowin (1990) documents that as smaller firms tend, on average, to be more risky, first 
day returns are expected to be bearish related to firm size.  
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Oversubscription: Oversubscription occurs when demand for shares exceeds the supply of 
shares offered for sale in a fixed price sale. As a result, the underwriters or investment bankers 
must allocate the shares among investors. Keloharju (1993) and Deloof et al. (2009) report that a 
higher oversubscription reflects the greater absorption capacity of the market.  
Underwriter reputation: The lead underwriter plays an important role in pricing and 
distributing an IPO, certifying the quality of the issue by their past performance in IPO 
underwriting. In line with the underwriter certification hypothesis, issuers affiliated with more 
reputable underwriters are likely to exhibit lower underpricing. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter 
and Manaster (1990), Kim and Ritter (1999) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), Migliorati and 
Vismara (2013) specify that prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings and 
lower initial returns expected from IPOs underwritten by reputable banks. Additionally much of 
the extant empirical literature find a negative relationship between underwriter reputation and 
level of fees [e.g. Kim, Palia and Saunders, (2010)]. However, there is also opposing evidence 
that suggests that underpricing may include a component of underwriter compensation, Hansen 
and Tarregrosa (1992). In the Greek data we use the dummy variable with value 1 for all IPOs 
underwritten by five ‘major’ underwriter banks, as opposed to other smaller banks and 
investment service firms.  
Given Ownership:  This is the percentage of ownership sold by pre-IPO shareholders. By 
selling a small percentage of their firm, original owners may signal firm quality (Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001)).  
Industry classification: IPOs are classified in groups based on their sector. Gajewski and Gresse 
(2006) use industry as a variable that affects average initial underpricing. Spiess and Pettway 
(1995) working on a sample of industrial firms find that initial underpricing is significantly 
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lower
4
. Our dummy variable takes the value 1 for manufacturing sectors and 0 for service 
industries. 
Sectoral concentrations: During the period of study there were instances in which firms 
belonging to a single sector performed numerous IPOs within short periods. A large number (25) 
of construction companies were listed in the Athens Stock Exchange during 1993-1994 while 
many IT companies (17) were listed during the IT boom of 1999-2001. Further, many media and 
print companies (11) were listed during 1998-2000. These sectoral clusters of IPO supply could 
indicate a form of sectoral sentiment over and above other measures of supply competition. 
Thus, we tested three dummy variables (CONS), (IT) and (MED) which take a value of 1 for the 
corresponding IPOs. These variables were never significant so we skip them in the estimations 
and results which follow
5
.  
Appendix A summarizes the explanatory variables, briefly giving their definition and 
measurements. The main regression model is specified as follows: 
 
MAU or MAUR = a0 + γ1 LBC + γ2 AGE + γ3 PRIV + γ4 SIZE + γ5 OVER + γ6 UR + γ7 RET + 
γ8NUIPO +γ9 GO + γ10 IND + γ11 PC8 + γ12 PC99 + γ13ΒΒ +εi                 (8) 
 
 
If the regulatory price limits effectively lower underpricing, we expect to find that, 
 
                                               γ11 < γ12 < 0                        (9) 
 
The effect of book-building on underpricing will be captured by γ13. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We defined as ‘industrial’ IPOs those firms which belong to Chemical, Manufacturing, Metals, Minerals & Shipyards sub-
sectors and attached to them a value of one. Non-industrial categories are mainly Conglomerates, Real Estate/Property, 
Transportation, Tourism and Hotels etc. These take the value of zero. 
5
 We also located a few firms whose IPO included overallotment options (green shoe). We tested a dummy variable for these 
cases but no significant results were found.  We also collected data on institutional allocations (INAL) which were however 
available only after 1998. We use this variable only in the sample partition that includes the ‘no limit’ period. See below, section 
5.3. 
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5.  Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Tests on the Entire Sample 
 
 The estimation of equation (8) is our basic test for the entire sample and is shown in 
Table 4. Four estimations are shown, including in turn the control variables and the regulatory 
variables (price limit dummies and book-building). The dependent variable is the market 
adjusted unconstrained return MAU
6
. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
Please Insert Table 4 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Focusing first on the regulatory variables, which are the central issue in these tests, we 
see that only PC8 - the dummy representing periods with an 8 percent daily limit - obtains a 
significant negative coefficient. Other regulatory variables, PC99 (the 99 percent limit) and 
book-building do not obtain significant coefficients. The non-significance of PC99 implies that 
regulation of daily variation was indeed neutral towards underpricing during the period 1996-
1999
7
. The non-significance of book-building, which as we said was mandated from 2001 
onwards, is equally telling since it implies that at the level of the overall sample its imposition 
did not correct underpricing on average. (This conclusion is revisited below in 5.2. with sample 
partitions). 
  Among the control variables there are two which exert a consistent positive and 
significant effect on underpricing. These are over-subscription and the percent of given 
ownership. Size also appears as a significant negative influence on underpricing. All effects are 
in the expected direction and in line with international evidence. More specifically, whereas a 
positive effect of oversubscription reveals the amount of demand pressure at the time of 
placement, the effects of size and given ownership are proxies of the degree of asymmetry of 
                                                 
6 In this and all subsequent estimations we have excluded one extreme outlier that occurred during the ‘hot’ 1999 period and 
offered an unconstrained return exceeding 700 percent.   
7
 The variable PC99 was not significant in any of the remaining tests. Thus, it has been skipped in the Tables that follow.  
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information. We note here that all market segments are included in this first test, whereas more 
specific tests by market venue follow next.  .  
 
5.2 Sample Partition by Market Venue  
 
Vismara et al. (2012) indicate that European stock exchanges have repeatedly opened 
second markets to list small companies. Greece's stock exchange followed this rule and 
established the secondary market in 1989. We take advantage of this regulatory initiative and in 
Table 5, we test the model of underpricing on subsamples defined by the different segments of 
the market. The partition of the sample isolates the main market on one hand and the parallel and 
new markets on the other. As we have already seen in descriptive statistics (Table 2) the two 
segments differ in the average size of offering and in the average degree of underpricing. 
Furthermore, the less severe listing requirements that hold for the parallel and new markets 
imply that IPOs in that segment probably belong to higher risk classes and involve higher 
information asymmetries. In Table 5 we perform estimations of equation (8) separately for the 
two market segments. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
Please Insert Table 5 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Looking first at the estimations for the main market – a sample of 183 IPOs – we note 
several important findings. Regulatory variables are again significant and wield considerable 
explanatory power. In the first place, the variable associated with the strict variation limit PC8 
appears again to exercise a significant and negative influence on average underpricing, as was 
found in the overall sample. However, in contrast to the overall sample, the introduction of book-
building is now shown to also exert a significant negative influence. Thus, it appears that the 
succession of regulatory devices - a price limit in the early period and mandatory book-building 
in the later period – were both effective in reducing average underpricing in the Greek IPO 
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market. The difference between these two devices is, according to our interpretation, 
illuminating. Price limits have acted indirectly by reducing incentives to under-price. Book-
building has operated directly on the process of determination of offer prices and has allowed 
underwriters to gauge more effectively the limits of demand for new issues. Focusing at the 
results for non-regulatory variables we further note that oversubscription, as in the case of the 
entire sample, exerts strong positive influence on underpricing.  
 Turning now to the parallel market, we note strong similarities but also differences. On 
the regulatory front, the role of PC8 is the same as in the main market, indicating that strict 
variation limits have reduced average underpricing; on the other hand, book-building is not 
significant. Over-subscription is uniformly significant everywhere. Furthermore, size also 
exhibits a negative effect here, as in the overall sample. The one variable that emerges as 
significant in the case of the parallel market is the one describing ‘underwriters reputation’ (UR). 
This variable obtains a significant negative coefficient. This strong result verifies that in the case 
of the risky and less known firms placing IPOs in the parallel (or new) market, the certification 
value of a reputable underwriter encourages considerable reduction in underpricing.  
 
5.3   Sample Partition by Regulatory Regime 
We have chosen a second type of partition of the sample, in order to offer a more direct 
comparison between two regimes, one with strict limits and the other without any limits. 
Estimations for these two basic regimes are shown below as columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. The no-
limit period itself is subdivided further into two sub-periods: the period prior to June 1992 and 
the period after December 1999, shown here (column 1). We have excluded the period of the 99 
percent limit in this examination, as we want to establish a comparison between two ‘clean’ 
regimes, one with strict limits and one without limits at all. In the last sub-period, post December 
1999, we have also included book-building (BB) and the variable institutional allocation (INAL) 
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which measures institutional allocation for each IPO
8
. This variable is not uniformly available in 
earlier periods.  
Lastly, we have also separated out the cases in which book-building was used as a 
distinct regime within the more general no-limit category. In estimating the equation for 
underpricing we have added the variable price revision (PREV) which measures the difference 
between the offer price and the mid-point of the book-building price range. This variable has 
been used in empirical studies of book-building [Hanley (1993), Sherman (2000), Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2001), Jenkinson and Jones (2004)] and there is some theoretical work on its 
significance in the European context [Jenkinson et. al. (2006)].  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
Please Insert Table 6 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In the period with strict variation limits (column 2) we note, once again, that over-
subscription is a strong positive determinant of underpricing. In addition, the variable measuring 
frequency of IPOs in any given quarter obtains a strong positive coefficient. This implies that 
pressure of competitive offerings increased underpricing.  
Turning to the no-limit regime (column 3), we note that over-subscription and the 
frequency of IPOs are consistently positive contributors to underpricing but that several 
important differences also arise. The size variable acquires a negative significant coefficient 
much in line with international evidence. The variable measuring the percent of ownership ceded 
in the IPO (GO) is also positive and significant in this regime. This is again in line with 
international evidence and indicates that as the share of ownership retained by original owners 
shrinks, the enticement of new investors requires higher price discounts.  
Neither book-building nor institutional allocations present any significant influence on 
underpricing in this sample segment. On the other hand, in the sample which includes book-
                                                 
8
 In very few cases (i.e. nine) the issuer compensated the underwriter for ancillary services. We control for price stabilization in   
  all cases this was applied.  
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building cases exclusively (column 4), the variable 'PREV' obtains a positive coefficient, 
implying that positive price revisions are correlated with higher ex-post initial returns. 
   
6. Robustness Checks 
 
6.1 The ‘Hot’ Period and Regulatory States 
Our empirical tests cover a long period in which different market phases are distinct. The 
period during which price limits were phased out includes a ‘hot market’ phase during which, as 
we showed, returns in the Greek market reached unprecedented high levels and this included first 
day returns of IPOs. Despite the use of control variables for the ‘hot market’ incident of 1999, 
there is still concern that the findings of lower returns in the regulated period is driven by 
uncharacteristically high returns in a portion of the unregulated period. We address this concern 
by conducting alternative checks of the robustness of our results by a series of exclusions of 
observations associated with the ‘hot market’ incident.  
 Besides the ‘hot market’, one feature of the change in the regulatory environment may 
also be the source of possible distortion: until mid 1992, there were no price limits at all whereas 
after that time price limits were imposed on the market as a whole, to be gradually relaxed after 
1999. One could argue that in the early (pre-1992) period the behavior of the market index, 
which we use for the adjustment of raw returns, was unconstrained and hence different from that 
of the ensuing period. Considering the whole population of listed companies however, casual 
observation suggests that only a few of their prices were hitting the price limit on any one day,  
so that their impact on the general market index was minimal. Nevertheless, and since this is an 
empirical issue, we re-estimate our basic regression excluding IPOs conducted from 1990 to mid 
1992, when there were no limits at all.  
 Three different exclusions are tested for robustness with respect to the ‘hot market’ of 
1999. In the first, we exclude seven outliers in which first day returns exceeded 300 percent and 
all of which occurred in the ‘hot market’ period. In the second, we exclude all observations from 
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the very hot third and fourth quarters of 1999. In the third test, we run our basic regression only 
for the period 1990-1998, excluding observations both from the very hot market period of 1999 
and its aftermath.  
We also conduct two re-estimations excluding observations from 1990 to mid-1992, the 
period of no general price limits. In the fourth column we re-estimate the basic regression also 
excluding the seven outliers of 1999; in the fifth column we present results after exclusion, 
besides pre-1992 IPOs, of the third and fourth quarters of 1999. In Table 7 we show the results of 
these regressions. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Please Insert Table 7 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The immediate observation from the estimations in Table 7 is that our main findings persist with 
the same directions of signs and similar levels of significance as in the main tests. More 
specifically the main regulatory variable PC8 remains consistently negative and significant in all 
tests.  
 It can therefore be safely concluded that the main findings are not driven by market 
condition and are robust.  
 
6.2  Industry Effects 
 
 The adjustment of raw IPO returns by simultaneous market returns may leave out other 
systematic shocks such as industry effects.  We have therefore formed an additional estimate of 
the dependent variable – MAUR – which embodies industry adjustments. This has been possible 
for only a portion of our sample however. Indices of industry groupings are estimated and 
published by the Athens Stock Exchange, but during most of our sample period their coverage of 
listed companies did not extend to the whole population. We have utilized five published indices: 
manufacturing, holding companies, investments, construction and wholesale trade. Using 
available time-series of these indices we have first extracted their orthogonal component to the 
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market index. We then matched IPOs to the sectors covered by these indices and adjusted raw 
returns using both market and industry returns. This resulted in a sample of 102 IPOs. 
Estimations of the basic regressions with the new variable MAUR are shown in Table 8. In the 
first three columns we re-estimate the main model. Columns 4 and 5 include estimations by 
partitioning into the main and the parallel markets. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Please Insert Table 8 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The results of the estimation of the main model using the market- and industry-adjusted 
MAUR are very similar to those found earlier, with strong and negative significant coefficients 
attaching both to price limit variable PC8 and the book-building variable BB. The strength of the 
results is underlined by the fact that use of the industry indices has reduced the sample to less 
than half its original size, but nevertheless the regulatory variables remain strongly significant. 
When we proceed to the partition into main and parallel markets however, samples are quite 
small and only PC8 retains its significance in the main market stratum.  We conclude again that 
our overall results are robust.  
 
 
7. Discussion of Results  
 All our evidence shows that while strict price limits were in force, IPO underpricing was 
much less severe in the Athens Stock Exchange. There is considerable detail that arises from our 
empirical work that must be added to this broad conclusion.  
First, we must consider the broader context of the tests. The Athens Stock Exchange 
experienced high underpricing, which averaged 52.63 percent for the entire sample period 
considered. Price limits did not eliminate underpricing but associated with a visible reduction. 
Secondly, the Greek market underwent considerable expansion during the sample period, with a 
distinct growth in volume and prices in 1999. This ‘boom’ period coincided with record 
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underpricing and took place after strict price limits had been phased out. In order to ensure that 
this ‘boom’ period does not distort our results, we have used control variables that capture 
market conditions (RET and NUIPO) and which appear significant in a number of our tests. We 
have also conducted extensive tests of robustness. We are confident that the estimated effect of 
price limits does not simply arise from differences in market conditions.  
The more severe underpricing that is found in the parallel and new markets as compared 
to the main market is observable both in periods with and without price limits. This is a clear 
indication that information asymmetries lie at the root of the underpricing phenomenon, since 
there is a ‘class distinction’ between firms entering the main market and those entering the 
parallel and new markets by virtue of different listing requirements.  
Finally, findings indicate that when the sample is partitioned by regulatory regime, we 
can conclude that under different regulatory regimes, different variables become relevant. 
Further research on samples limited within one or the other period may lead to different but valid 
conclusions. Hence, institutional detail matters very much and regulatory changes should be 
carefully accounted for in tests of this type. 
 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
We conducted a direct test of the impact of price limits on IPO underpricing. There 
has been no other such direct test to our knowledge. The Greek market has offered this 
unique opportunity for testing, as daily variation limits for newly listed shares changed three 
times in a process of liberalization over seven years. 
Our basic finding supports the hypothesis that price limits actually reduce underpricing. 
This contradicts general statements t hat regulatory intervention increases 
underpricing. In part, the contradiction is due to the fact that direct 
intervention with price limits, or successive limit relaxations within a few 
years in the same Exchange have not been tested before. Our evidence is clear since 
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this effect appears strong not only when we compare a period with narrow limits with a 
period with no limits, but also when we compare periods with limits of different range.  
Routine regulatory explanations of price limits focus on the reduction of speculation 
and the moderation of market volatility. The results we obtained show an unexpected gain in 
efficiency in the pricing of newly listed stocks which has not been previously recognized 
by researchers, nor has been explicitly embedded in regulatory arguments. Nevertheless, as the 
recent example of Indian regulation shows, price limits on early trading of IPO shares is used 
in an anti-manipulation context.  
Our findings are robust, as we have tested for the possible interference of ‘hot 
market’ and other conditions, the possible effect of industry factors and a number of 
control variables. An important finding is that in regulated and unregulated periods the role of 
control variables changes. This suggests that empirical tests are sensitive to institutional 
arrangements and that different regulatory restrictions may lead to validation of different 
models. This finding has direct implications for research design.  
An underlying implication of our findings is that market participants (issuers, 
underwriters, investors) adjust their behavior to the regulatory environment, as this may 
change incentives for underpricing. A variant of this implication, in the spirit of Boehme and 
Colak (2012), is that the population of participating investors is itself changing not only 
during hot IPO markets but also during periods when price limits are imposed. Clearly this is a 
matter that merits further research.  
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Appendix A. Variables Definitions 
  
Variable Name 
in Abbreviation 
Variable 
Definition 
Type of 
Measure 
Expected 
Sign 
Panel A:  Measures of Abnormal Returns 
RAU 
Level of underpricing (unconstrained or fair market price) which considers 2
nd
, 3
rd
 
etc days of trading until the price will reach its unconstrained level. 
Continuous  
MAU 
Calculates the level of underpricing by the time the unconstrained price will occur. 
Returns are adjusted for the market effect. 
Continuous  
MAUR Calculates the level of underpricing adjusted for industry specific shocks. Continuous  
Panel B:  IPOs Characteristics 
LBC 
Dummy variable: 1 if an IPO is listed in Main Market and ‘0’ if listed in Parallel or 
New Market. 
Discrete + 
AGE 
Age of the firm starting from the year of its establishment until the year it goes 
public. 
Continuous - 
PRIV 
Companies owed by the State before going public. State sells part of its holdings on 
those companies in the market. 
Discrete + 
SIZE 
Market capitalization measured by the log of the total number of outstanding shares 
after the IPO multiplied by price per share. 
Continuous - 
OVER Oversubscription on the number of shares issued. Continuous + 
UR Dummy variable: 1 for reputable  underwriters (major banks), 0 otherwise. Discrete - 
GO Proportion of given ownership during the going public process. Continuous + 
IND Dummy variable: 1 for industrial companies, 0 otherwise. Discrete - 
Panel C:  Market Characteristics 
RET Quarterly market rate of return divided by overall quarterly average. Continuous - 
NUIPO Quarterly number of IPOs divided by the average number of IPOs in all quarters. Continuous + 
INAL 
The percentage of shares allocated to institutional investors during the public 
offering process. 
Continuous - 
PREV 
Price Revision is the difference between the IPO offer price and the center of the 
price range in the case of offers with book-building. 
Continuous + 
GS 
Green Shoe or overallotment allows underwriters to  sell additional shares at the 
offering price; dummy variable takes value of 1 if Green shoe is present. 
Discrete + 
BB 
Book-building is the process of recording investor demand for shares during an IPO 
in order to support efficient price discovery. Dummy variable with value 1. 
Discrete - 
Panel D: Price Limit Characteristics 
Cap ±8% 
Dummy variable: 1 IPOs listed with a price cap limitation of ±8%, otherwise 0 
Cap ±8%: IPOs listed in ASE with a price cap limitation of ±8% during Nov. 1993 – 
Nov. 1996 period. 
Discrete - 
Cap ±99% 
Dummy variable: 1 IPOs listed with a price cap limitation of ±99%, otherwise 0 
Cap ±99%: IPOs listed in ASE during Dec. 1996 - Dec. 1999 period. 
Discrete - 
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Appendix B. Underpricing of Greek IPOs (Quarterly Returns) 
The appendix classifies the four regulatory periods by quarter. Those are from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1992 (trading without 
limits), July 1, 1992 to November 30, 1996 (limit of ±8%), December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1999 (limit of ±99%) and finally 
from December 1, 1999 to December 31, 2013 (trading without limits). From last quarter of 2009 till last quarter of 2013 no IPO 
was listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
 Quarter No of IPOs Mean of RAU (%) Mean of MAU (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No ceiling 
Jan 1990 – Mar 1990 4 129.26 114.34 
Apr 1990 – June 1990 5 147.65 116.14 
July 1990 – Sep 1990 9 94.12 96.89 
Oct 1990 – Dec 1990 10 27.52 30.48 
Jan 1991 – Mar 1991 2 30.44 10.77 
Apr 1991 – June 1991 5 47.18 51.90 
July 1991 – Sep 1991 6 34.35 37.00 
Oct 1991 – Dec 1991 1 -12.39 -14.98 
Jan 1992 – Mar 1992 3 -15.66 -14.29 
Apr 1992 – June 1992 1 9.72 7.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
±8% Cap 
July 1992 – Sep 1992 1 -18.86 -31.67 
Oct 1992 – Dec 1992 0 - - 
Jan 1993 – Mar 1993 0 - - 
Apr 1993 – June 1993 0 - - 
July 1993 – Sep 1993 5 17.33 5.94 
Oct 1993 – Dec 1993 5 31.07 17.43 
Jan 1994 – Mar 1994 3 94.39 94.16 
Apr 1994 – June 1994 14 19.94 41.01 
July 1994 – Sep 1994 12 26.00 34.63 
Oct 1994 – Dec 1994 17 22.06 25.29 
Jan 1995 – Mar 1995 3 22.45 24.52 
Apr 1995 – June 1995 5 -2.55 -4.99 
July 1995 – Sep 1995 6 40.65 37.79 
Oct 1995 – Dec 1995 6 36.83 39.71 
Jan 1996 – Mar 1996 7 29.86 28.06 
Apr 1996 – June 1996 4 18.96 22.02 
July 1996 – Sep 1996 5 16.76 15.67 
Oct 1996 – Nov 1996 1 34.16 34.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
±99% Cap 
Dec 1996 - Mar 1997 5 5.79 1.70 
Apr 1997 – June 1997 4 17.84 10.83 
July 1997 – Sep 1997 4 51.79 51.83 
Oct 1997 – Dec 1997 2 100.76 108.79 
Jan 1998 – Mar 1998 5 74.68 64.06 
Apr 1998 – June 1998 3 93.21 70.78 
July 1998 – Sep 1998 7 91.56 91.45 
Oct 1998 – Dec 1998 8 51.54 44.06 
Jan 1999 – Mar 1999 7 98.47 85.75 
Apr 1999 – June 1999 9 92.07 89.17 
July 1999 – Sep 1999 8 222.90 202.00 
Oct 1999 –  Dec 1999 14 243.50 249.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No ceiling 
Jan 2000 – Mar 2000 18 136.75 136.98 
Apr 2000 – June 2000 14 27.75 31.07 
July 2000 – Sep 2000 13 8.63 9.06 
Oct 2000 –  Dec 2000 8 -2.99 -3.45 
Jan 2001 – Mar 2001 3 -0.67 4.58 
Apr 2001 – June 2001 7 69.87 68.26 
July 2001 – Sep 2001 5 -3.11 4.02 
Oct 2001 –  Dec 2001 6 42.54 47.21 
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 * From the last quarter of 2009 till the last quarter of 2013 no IPO was listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Appendix C. List of Underwriters, 1990-2013 
 
The largest banks (Reputable Underwriters) in Greece over the covered period are Alpha Bank, Commercial Bank, 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias, National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan 2002 – Mar 2002 8 70.86 72.01 
 Apr 2002 – June 2002 4 -2.34 0.59 
 July 2002 – Sep 2002 7 13.57 17.56 
 Oct 2002 –  Dec 2002 3 -11.16 -5.20 
 Jan 2003 – Mar 2003 5 -14.59 -15.17 
 Apr 2003 – June 2003 2 6.44 5.03 
 July 2003 – Sep 2003 6 19.83 7.77 
 Oct 2003 –  Dec 2003 2 16.26 25.97 
 Jan 2004 – Mar 2004 6 -8.19 -3.82 
 Apr 2004 – June 2004 4 -2.67 1.45 
 July 2004 – Sep 2004 0 - - 
 Oct 2004–  Dec 2004 1 -3.72 -7.03 
 Jan 2005 – Mar 2005 0 - - 
 Apr 2005 – June 2005 5 1.54 2.34 
 July 2005 – Sep 2005 1 -3.24 1.25 
 Oct 2005–  Dec 2005 1 31.62 27.28 
 Jan 2006 – Mar 2006 0 - - 
 Apr 2006– June 2006 2 10.40 10.83 
 July 2006 – Sep 2006 0 - - 
 Oct 2006–  Dec 2006 0 - - 
 Jan 2007 – Mar 2007 0 - - 
 Apr 2007– June 2007 1 94.72 92.69 
 July 2007 – Sep 2007 1 22.36 19.88 
 Oct 2007–  Dec 2007 1 -4.90 -2.88 
 July 2008 – Sep 2008 1 -2.66 -2.95 
 July 2009 – Sep 2009* 1 4.0 2.5 
Underwriters (Reputable) 
     Νο  
of IPOs 
Underwriters (Inexperienced) 
     Νο  
of IPOs 
EFG Eurobank - Ergasias 42 Agricultural Bank of Greece 12 
Commercial Bank 49 ΕΤΕΒΑ 18 
National Bank of Greece 52 Bank of Chios 3 
Piraeus Bank 39 Other Greek Banks 15 
Αlpha Bank 36 Foreign Banks 25 
  Αlpha Finance 18 
  Other Financial Institutions 42 
Total 218 Total 133 
Αll Listed IPOs 351   
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Table 1 
Greek IPO Sample Description 
The table presents details of the Greek IPOs by market of listing (main, parallel, new) in every calendar year and total annual capital raised by 
IPOs.  
 
Event Year IPO firms full 
sample 
Main  
Market 
Parallel 
Market 
New  
Market 
Total Capital 
Raised ‘000 
Euros 
1990 28 23 5 - 108,418 
1991 14 11 3 - 124,191 
1992 5 5 - - 26.560 
1993 10 10 - - 60,983 
1994 46 36 10 - 263,360 
1995 20 10 10 - 70,003 
1996 20 7 13 - 336,562 
1997 12 3 9 - 50,743 
1998 23 10 13 - 924,061 
1999 38 15 23 - 1,182,523 
2000 53 18 35 - 2,842,882 
2001 21 13 6 2 1,497,054 
2002 21 8 9 4 99,712 
2003 15 1 12 2 121,332 
2004 11 4 4 3 87,126 
2005 7 3 3 1 81,860 
2006 2 2 - - 725,248 
2007 3 3 - - 500,733 
2008 1 1 - - 23,337 
2009 1 1 - - 10,000 
2010 0 - - - - 
2011 0 - - - - 
2012 0 - - - - 
2013 0 - - - - 
      
Total 351 184 155 12 8,791,468 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Raw and Market Adjusted Initial Returns 
Panel A shows the initial returns at the end of the first day of unconstrained trading. Panel B shows maximum and minimum underpricing 
(equilibrium or fair market price) which considers 2nd, 3rd etc. days of trading until the IPO will reach its equilibrium. Panel C indicates the 
number of days in which prices of IPOs reached the upper price limit during early trading in ASE. Panel D highlights the number of cases 
clearing on the first, second and later trading days (Price limit ±8%). Panel E highlights  the number of cases clearing on the first, second, and 
later trading days (Price limit ±99% )  The raw underpricing (returns reach their equilibrium price in more than one day of trading in the cases of 
price cap) is measured as RΑUi,t=(EPi,t-OPi,0)/OPi,0. The Market Adjusted Underpricing (MAU) is calculated as MAU=[(EPi,t-OPi,0)/OPi,0-(MIi,t-
MIi,0/Mi,0)]. Overall the sample as appears in Figure 1 is divided into four periods. These periods are from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1992 
(trading without limits), July 1, 1992 to November 30, 1996 (limit of ±8%), December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1999 (limit of ±99%) and finally 
from December 1, 1999 to December 31, 2013 (trading without limits).  
Panel A: Division of the sample into four periods based on regulation of daily variation  
 Period No of IPOs Mean (median) of  
RAU (%) 
Mean (median) of 
MAU (%) 
No ceiling Jan 1990 – Dec 2013 191  43.74 (12.47) 44.10 (16.23) 
 Jan 1990 – Jun 1992 47 56.00 (33.39) 52.15 (36.49) 
 Dec 1999 - Dec 2013 144 40.55 (10.32) 41.86 (12.64) 
±8% limit Jul 1992 - Nov 1996 93 26.22 (16.84) 29.62 (23.48) 
±99% limit Dec 1996 - Nov 1999 67 112.88 (84.57) 105.66 (70.80) 
 
Overall 
 
Jan 1990 – Dec 2013 
 
351 
 
52.48 (22.51) 
 
52.15 (24.27) 
Panel B: Maximum and Minimum value of IPO initial performance and Underpricing  
 No of IPOs Max (min) of RAU (%) Max (min) of MAU  
No ceiling 191  472.24 (-76.67) 472.34 (-67.35) 
±8% limit 93 133.17 (-8.00) 120.82 (-17.30) 
±99% limit 67 751.07 (-4.54) 748.00 (-41.84) 
Overall 351 751.07 (-76.67) 748.00 (-41.84) 
Panel C: Number of days in which prices of IPOs hit their price limit during early trading in ASE 
 Period with price limit: ±8% Period with price lim it: ±99% 
Mean 2.59 0.67 
Median 2.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation 2.80 0.88 
Minimum no of limit hits (ups or downs) 0.00 0.00 
Maximum no of consecutive ‘limit ups’ 11 3 
Maximum no of consecutive ‘limit downs’ 1 0 
Panel D: No of cases clearing on the  first, second, and later trading days (Price limit ±8% ) 
Continuous Limit Ups Obs. MAU Size (m €) Age Given Own. 
0 26 0.567 5,889 15.11 23.37 
1 14 19.01 19,883 18.42 21.74 
2 12 25.15 4,550 14.91 21.35 
3 20 27.44 4,964 19.1 21.92 
4 4 60.20 6,621 17.75 23.13 
5 3 55.23 2,329 30.3 19.67 
6 3 56.72 2,009 13.33 35.83 
7 4 89.39 2,645 28.25 19.34 
8 3 78.48 1,342 12.33 16.02 
9-11 4 113.53 2,150 19.5 19.55 
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Panel E: No of cases clearing on the  first, second, and later trading days  (Price limit ±99% ) 
Continuous Limit Ups Obs. MAU Size (m €) Age Given Own. 
0 38 31.71 28,849 19.5 18.71 
1 17 151.8 16,364 19.8 19.52 
2 8 90.59 17,229 14.6 17.48 
3 4 642.22 6,110 10.7 11.96 
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Table 3  
Greek IPOs Classified by Listing Market (Main, Parallel, New) 
The table presents means and medians for various characteristics of Greek IPOs by market classification. Specification (1) indicates underpricing measured by market adjusted underpricing (MAU); 
Specification (2) provides the size, which is expressed by the log of market capitalization and specification (3) the age, which describes the period between the year of company establishment and the 
year it goes public. Specification (4) depicts the given ownership which covers the proportion of sold ownership during the going public process. MAU calculates the level of underpricing by the time 
the unconstrained price will occur. The sample period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with mainly hand collected data.  
 
 Listing 
Market 
    Number 
    of IPOs 
Underpricing  
(measured by MAU) (1) 
Size (m €) 
(2) 
Age 
(3) 
Public Float 
Given Ownership (4) 
   mean median mean median mean median mean median 
Whole sample Main 184 37.04 15 38,845 6,076 19.97 17 19.57 20 
 Parallel 155 71.21 33.46 6,863 3,619 15.75 13 21.48 21.56 
 New  12 54.54 13.93 4,965 3,762 13.15 11 17.16 15 
 Total 351 52.63 22.52 23,427 4,933 17.86 14 21.69 20.96 
No Price Cap Main 95 37.45 6.60 55,288 7,777 19.82 15 19.48 20.07 
 Parallel 85 50.63 21.93 9,521 7,420 16.1 14 17.36 16.61 
 New  13 54.54 13.93 4,965 3,762 13.15 11 21.69 20.06 
 Total 191 44.35 12.10 31,728 6,701 17.74 14 18.69 20 
±8% Cap Main 62 22.74 19.37 9,514 4.705 18.14 15.5 23.54 22.30 
 Parallel 31 43.39 34.59 1,878 1,390 16.67 15 19.67 17.26 
 Total 93 29.62 23.48 6,968 2,988 17.65 15 22.25 21.35 
±99% Cap Main 27 63.46 56.85 49,977 15,870 24.70 22 23.6 21.11 
 Parallel 40 134.2 84.39 5,211 2,266 14.3 11 14.8 13.7 
 Total 67 105.7 70.81 22,846 5,693 18.49 13 18.4 15.9 
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Table 4: Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation in MAU as 
dependent variable for 351 IPOs listed on ASE over the 1990-2013 period end of 2
nd
, 
3
rd…11th day of trading for price cap period 
The table presents in specification (1) the estimates of OLS regression where the dependent variable is the market adjusted underpricing which 
accounts for the returns of the following day(s) in case where IPO hits the upper/lower limit. Specification (2) presents the estimates of OLS 
regression where the independent variables PC8 (PC99), take the value of one if the IPO is listed in the period with a price constraint of ±8% 
(±99%), and zero otherwise. Specification (3) presents the estimates of OLS regression where the independent variable BB (bookbuilding) takes 
the value of one if the IPO is listed using the book-building mechanism, and zero if it is listed with the fixed offer price method. The sample 
period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with hand collected data. See Appendix A for definitions of the 
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Results have been corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors. Number in parentheses are p-values.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
 
 
 
 
 MAU 
(1) 
MAU 
(2) 
MAU 
(3) 
MAU 
(4) 
Constant 21.45 78.57** 82.38** 84.74** 
 (0.489) (0.036) (0.033) (0.028) 
LBC -1.194 6.111 6.106 4.996 
 (0.842) (0.330) (0.330) (0.418) 
AGE 4.954 7.130* 7.295* 6.572 
 (0.199) (0.068) (0.063) (0.106) 
PRIV -8.373 -7.206 -7.027 -4.396 
 (0.513) (0.565) (0.578) (0.742) 
SIZE -1.425 -5.895** -6.084** -5.768** 
 (0.492) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) 
OVER 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.283*** 0.280*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR -4.200 -2.722 -2.123 -1.896 
 (0.500) (0.656) (0.728) (0.756) 
RET 1.016 0.983 1.142 1.049 
 (0.234) (0.242) (0.200) (0.235) 
NUIPO 2.139 6.073 5.592 4.652 
 (0.585) (0.152) (0.173) (0.258) 
GO 0.293 0.563* 0.578* 0.631** 
 (0.276) (0.064) (0.059) (0.041) 
IND 13.02 11.51 11.62 11.84 
 (0.115) (0.160) (0.156) (0.147) 
PC8  -24.92*** -26.68*** -30.38*** 
  (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) 
PC99   -6.491 -9.806 
   (0.501) (0.356) 
BB    -9.993 
    (0.341) 
     
Adj R
2 
350 350 350 350 
Obs. 0.344 0.359 0.359 0.360 
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Table 5: Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis By Listing Board Classification  
The table presents in specifications (1) and (2) the estimates of OLS regressions based on a sample of IPOs that were listed in the main market of 
the stock exchange and in specifications (3) and (4) on a sample of  IPOs that were listed in the parallel market of the stock exchange where the 
dependent variable is the market adjusted underpricing (MAU) which accounts for the returns of the following day(s) in case where the IPO hits 
the upper/ lower limit. The sample period is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with largely hand collected 
data. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. 
Results have been corrected for Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors. Number in parentheses are p-values.  The symbols *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
 
 MAU (Main)  
(1) 
MAU (Main)  
(2) 
MAU (Parallel)  
(3) 
MAU (Parallel)  
(4) Variables 
Constant 47.07 49.68 217.8** 217.9** 
 (0.341) (0.334) (0.022) (0.021) 
AGE 1.524 3.301 -11.89 -11.94 
 (0.723) (0.436) (0.432) (0.421) 
PRIV -5.583 -11.49 8.432 8.508 
 (0.716) (0.429) (0.711) (0.709) 
SIZE -2.648 -3.607 -12.47* -12.46* 
 (0.434) (0.304) (0.058) (0.056) 
OVER 0.279*** 0.297*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR 11.51 10.29 -20.44* -20.47* 
 (0.157) (0.203) (0.093) (0.085) 
RET 1.640 1.937* -1.918 -1.928 
 (0.104) (0.051) (0.298) (0.299) 
NUIPO 4.125 4.238 8.592 8.525 
 (0.305) (0.261) (0.387) (0.394) 
GO 0.689 0.761 0.762 0.770 
 (0.235) (0.214) (0.275) (0.239) 
IND 16.59* 15.30 27.23 27.21 
 (0.093) (0.130) (0.125) (0.123) 
PC8 -34.49*** -29.18*** -28.54* -28.70** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.055) (0.037) 
BB -20.25*  0.469  
 (0.075)  (0.971)  
     
Adj. R
2
 0.280 0.267 0.446 0.449 
Obs. 183 183 167 167 
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Table 6: Sample Partition by Regulatory Period 
Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation with MAU as dependent variable over the sample period between January 
1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with largely hand collected data. The table presents in specification (1) the results of IPOs 
that were listed without any price limit and in specification (2) the estimates of OLS regression on IPOs that were listed during the ±8% price 
limit period. Specification (3) looks at IPOs that went public without any price limit over the period Dec 1, 1999 till Dec 31, 2013. Specification 
(4) includes IPOs that were priced by the book-building method and investigates the price revision effect. See Appendix A for definitions of the 
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Results have been corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors. Number in parentheses are p-values. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.    
 
Variable MAU 
(NoPL) (1) 
MAU 
(PL8) (2) 
MAU  
(NOPL post 1999) (3) 
MAU  
(Book Building) (4) 
Constant 154.9** 8.742 38.52 -112.7 
 (0.010) (0.840) (0.528) (0.146) 
LBC 26.71*** -12.98 3.116 -15.55 
 (0.004) (0.136) (0.807) (0.221) 
AGE 11.96* 5.233 1.337 -3.989 
 (0.056) (0.161) (0.826) (0.431) 
PRIV -12.21 -9.336 -12.73 -12.67 
 (0.494) (0.272) (0.274) (0.439) 
SIZE -14.00*** 0.447 -6.383 4.318 
 (0.002) (0.888) (0.163) (0.295) 
OVER 0.320*** 0.200*** 0.423*** 1.347** 
 (0.0001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) 
UR -9.601 4.515 -9.704 13.03 
 (0.326) (0.403) (0.371) (0.418) 
RET 1.350 -1.925 -0.565 1.282 
 (0.202) (0.206) (0.749) (0.610) 
NUIPO 16.85** -6.443* 13.04** 33.95* 
 (0.010) (0.076) (0.044) (0.071) 
GO 1.584** 0.216 1.613** 0.377 
 (0.018) (0.374) (0.023) (0.330) 
IND 17.01* 7.793 5.744 0.598 
 (0.0788) (0.468) (0.580) (0.968) 
BB   9.21 - 
   (0.228) - 
INAL   0.321 0.327 
   (0.137) (0.240) 
PREV    0.592** 
    (0.030) 
     
Adj R
2 
0.412 0.351 0.364 0.340 
Obs 191 93 140 90 
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Table 7: Robustness and Auxiliary Tests (ALL IPOs)  
Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation with MAU as dependent variable for IPOs listed on ASE over the sample 
period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with largely hand collected data. Specification (1) excludes the 7 
outliers of the sample of Greek IPOs. Specification (2) excludes the ‘Hot’ 3rd and 4th quarters of 1999. Specification (3) includes only IPOs listed 
between 1990-1998. Specification (4) examines the period  mid  1992-2013,  excluding the 7 outliers of the sample of Greek IPOs. Specification 
(5) excludes the period 1990-mid 1992 and the ‘Hot’ 3rd and 4th quarters of 1999.  See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Results have been corrected for Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered 
standard errors. Number in parentheses are p-values. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.    
 IPOs listed in the period 1990-2013 IPOs listed in the post 1992 period 
 MAU  
IPOs exclude outliers 
(1) 
MAU  
Exclude 3rd & 4th  
Quarter 1999 (2) 
MAU 
IPOs 1990-1998 
(3) 
MAU  
IPOs exc. outliers, 
 (4) 
MAU exc. 3rd and 
4th Qrts of 1999 (5) 
Constant 74.74** 95.34** 118.1* 32.94 55.10 
 (0.047) (0.013) (0.085) (0.331) (0.103) 
LBC 7.080 2.128 5.832 -1.916 -9.037 
 (0.232) (0.742) (0.533) (0.739) (0.142) 
AGE 2.887 4.338 6.586 -0.396 1.385 
 (0.452) (0.277) (0.204) (0.917) (0.720) 
PRIV -5.702 -0.871 -4.338 -3.873 2.357 
 (0.653) (0.946) (0.918) (0.582) (0.708) 
SIZE -4.822* -5.948** -6.952** -1.783 -2.967 
 (0.071) (0.030) (0.018) (0.482) (0.243) 
OVER 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.186*** 0.283*** 0.287*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR 2.329 -2.077 2.981 4.162 -0.356 
 (0.676) (0.732) (0.675) (0.456) (0.953) 
RET 1.326 0.770 0.574 1.378 -0.582 
 (0.124) (0.399) (0.580) (0.247) (0.610) 
NUIPO 5.382** 5.499* -1.028 -0.594 2.205 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.818) (0.845) (0.582) 
GO 0.838* 0.487 0.126 0.857* 0.522* 
 (0.073) (0.131) (0.762) (0.075) (0.063) 
IND 10.12 9.024 17.00 4.225 3.393 
 (0.171) (0.229) (0.145) (0.572) (0.645) 
PC8 -25.79*** -26.35*** -21.03** -13.25* -12.95* 
 (0.0009) (0.001) (0.033) (0.069) (0.086) 
BB -10.10 -9.897 12.30 -3.377 -4.018 
 (0.200) (0.214) (0.701) (0.674) (0.632) 
      
Obs. 343 329 178 296 282 
Adj. R
2
 0.294 0.291 0.158 0.371 0.364 
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Table 8: Robustness and Auxiliary Tests (Adjusted for Industry Specific Shocks) 
Results of multivariate regression analysis of cross sectional variation with MAUR as dependent variable for IPOs listed on ASE over the sample 
period between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2013 for Greek listed firms with largely hand collected data. The dependent variable is a 
continuous variable controlling for industry effect. Specification (1) provides a generic cross sectional regression for the whole sample of Greek 
IPOs. Specification (2) includes the ±PC8 control variable in the regression. Specification (3) tests for book-building effect in addition to all 
others. Specification (4) includes only IPOs listed in the Main Market while specification (5) covers IPOs listed in the Parallel Market. See 
Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Results have been corrected for Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered 
standard errors. Number in parentheses are p-values. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.    
 MAUR 
All (1) 
 
MAUR 
All (2) 
 
MAUR 
All (3) 
MAUR 
Main Market 
(4) 
MAUR 
Parallel Market 
(5) 
Constant -89.01 -7.834 -11.60 110.3 -410.0 
 (0.196) (0.925) (0.887) (0.225) (0.126) 
LBC 18.04* 30.13** 29.60** - - 
 (0.098) (0.021) (0.018) - - 
AGE 2.566 4.354 0.310 9.965 -11.75 
 (0.719) (0.556) (0.969) (0.205) (0.570) 
SIZE 6.846 0.693 2.474 -4.527 29.46* 
 (0.158) (0.907) (0.676) (0.467) (0.098) 
OVER 0.165* 0.150* 0.142 -0.049 0.355** 
 (0.060) (0.097) (0.117) (0.346) (0.011) 
UR -0.858 1.801 1.612 7.422 10.19 
 (0.945) (0.885) (0.896) (0.598) (0.563) 
RET 0.531 0.452 0.442 1.197 -6.097* 
 (0.816) (0.825) (0.821) (0.504) (0.073) 
NUIPO 15.63** 19.82*** 17.39*** 15.93** 0.101 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.007) (0.043) (0.996) 
GO -1.815** -1.395** -1.558** -0.909 -0.867 
 (0.020) (0.042) (0.024) (0.182) (0.698) 
PC8  -30.65** -33.83** -50.32*** 19.98 
  (0.027) (0.015) (0.004) (0.316) 
BB   -31.77** -34.66* -12.91 
   (0.016) (0.085) (0.499) 
      
Adj R
2
 0.208 0.234 0.249 0.111 0.560 
Obs. 102 102 102 60 42 
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Figure 1: Implementation of regulatory price limits on IPOs launched on A.S.E. during 1990-2013 period 
   The sample is divided into four periods. The first period, January 1, 1990 and June 30, 1992 is characterised by trading without any limits. In July 1992 the stock exchange imposed price limits of ±8% 
which remained until November 30, 1996. In December 1, 1996, the price limits were expanded to ±99% during the first 3 days of trading of IPO stocks and remained in force until November 30, 
1999. Finally on December 1, 1999 price limits were removed and early trading took place without limits. 
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